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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The scholarly debate over campus hate speech codes is most often 
characterized as a clash of absolutes, a conflict between two irrecon-
cilable moral and political visions. On one side are the so-called “free 
speech absolutists,” who reject hate speech1 restrictions on campuses 
and elsewhere based on their incompatibility with fundamental pre-
cepts of liberal democracy and individual autonomy.2 On the other 
side are critical race theorists and antipornography feminists who ar-
                                                                                                                     
 ∗  Associate Professor, Emory University School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. I 
wish to thank the participants in the 2008 First Amendment Discussion Forum for stimu-
lating conversation and thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this Essay. In particular, 
Russell Weaver’s energy and enthusiasm were instrumental in making the Forum a won-
derfully constructive experience. 
 1. “ ‘Hate speech’ is the generic term that has come to embrace the use of speech at-
tacks based on race, ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation or preference.” Rodney A. 
Smolla, Academic Freedom, Hate Speech, and the Idea of a University, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 195, 195 (1990). However, the definition of hate speech is by no means settled or 
clear. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s 
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2361-70 (1989) (considering several “hard cases” that fall at 
the edges of her definition of hate speech); Ronald Turner, Regulating Hate Speech and the 
First Amendment: The Attractions of, and Objections to, an Explicit Harms-Based Analysis, 
29 IND. L. REV. 257, 257-58 n.1 (1995) (collecting several different definitions of hate 
speech). For the purposes of this Essay, “I know it when I see it” should be sufficient to de-
fine the type of speech to which these ideas are directed. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 
197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of 
material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description [of hard-core por-
nography that may be criminalized under the First and Fourteenth Amendments]; and per-
haps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the mo-
tion picture involved in this case is not that.”). 
 2. As Professor Steven Gey has pointed out, the “absolutist” label is largely a rhetori-
cal device rather than an accurate description of the position. See Steven G. Gey, The Case 
Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 193, 219-20 n.84 (1996); see also 
Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 
484, 490 (disagreeing with the characterization of the civil libertarian position on hate 
speech, which was taken by a prominent critical race scholar, and specifically stating that 
“contrary to Professor [Charles] Lawrence’s assumption, traditional civil libertarians do not 
categorically reject every effort to regulate racist speech”). Recognizing this, I have put the 
descriptive label in quotation marks. I mention the extreme descriptions in order to frame 
the debate between what are in fact much more complicated and nuanced positions on both 
sides that, nonetheless, appear to be fundamentally irreconcilable. 
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gue that hate speech both creates and perpetuates a poisonous social 
atmosphere in which minorities and women are unable to realize 
genuine equality of citizenship.3 Too often, and ironically in the con-
text of a debate about the appropriate contours of the First Amend-
ment’s protection of freedom of speech, it seems as though the two 
sides are talking past one another rather than engaging in anything 
resembling a constructive dialogue. 
 It may be that there is no way to reconcile these polar positions, no 
middle ground that can be true to the assumptions that drive either 
side of the hate speech debate.4 As proponents of hate speech restric-
tions argue, hate speech potentially causes great harm;5 as opponents 
point out, government restriction of hate speech is content (and ar-
guably viewpoint) based and is a form of state-imposed political or-
thodoxy.6 Yet, despite an apparent consensus among the reported ju-
dicial decisions that sweeping hate speech regulations at public uni-
versities violate the First Amendment, issues regarding the legiti-
macy and desirability of campus hate speech restrictions are unlikely 
to disappear from the scholarly and political landscape.7 
                                                                                                                     
 3. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epi-
thets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 181 (1982) [hereinafter Delgado, 
Words That Wound] (concluding that a “review of the social science literature revealed that 
racism and racial insults influence the parenting practices of minority individuals and have a 
very great effect on children, thus perpetuating the harms of racism”); Matsuda, supra note 
1, at 2339 (“[A]t some level, no matter how much both victims and well-meaning dominant-
group members resist it, racial inferiority is planted in our minds as an idea that may hold 
some truth.”); Laura Beth Nielsen, Subtle, Pervasive, Harmful: Racist and Sexist Remarks in 
Public as Hate Speech, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 265, 266 (2002) (“If prejudice is about relative group 
position, then public hate speech provides a clear example of one of the ways in which such 
social hierarchies are constructed and reinforced on a day-to-day basis.”). 
 4. See Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Col-
lision, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 343, 346 (1991) (describing intractability of hate speech contro-
versy as a framing issue and arguing that “[t]he legal analysis, therefore, leads to opposite 
conclusions depending on the starting point[, wherein] . . . both sides invoke different narra-
tives to rally support”); see also Kenji Yoshino, The Eclectic Model of Censorship, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 1635, 1636-38 (2000) (reviewing CENSORSHIP AND SILENCING: PRACTICES OF CULTURAL 
REGULATION (Robert C. Post ed., 1998)) (contrasting the “classical model” of censorship with 
the “Foucaultian model” and then describing an intermediate position which he                  
labels “eclectic”). 
 5. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT 
WOUND 11-18 (2004) (summarizing harms of hate speech, including physical, psychological, 
economic, and social harms); Delgado, Words That Wound, supra note 3 (proposing a tort ac-
tion for racial insults and examining the harms caused by such insults); Charles R. Law-
rence III, If He Hollers, Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 
431 (arguing that protection of speech entails balancing of harms and offering a personal 
anecdote to illuminate the nature and extent of the harms of racist speech). 
 6. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (classifying the city’s hate 
speech ordinance as viewpoint discrimination and stating that “[t]he point of the First 
Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed in some fashion other than si-
lencing speech on the basis of its content”). 
 7. Federal courts have invalidated every university hate speech code that has thus far 
been challenged, primarily on grounds of overbreadth and vagueness. See, e.g., Coll. Repub-
licans at San Francisco State Univ. v. Reed, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1021, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 
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 In this Essay, I consider whether recent scientific findings about 
the nature of human attitude formation and decisionmaking, and the 
social cues that drive behavior, might have the potential to shift the 
hate speech debate such that some areas of common ground come into 
view. Specifically, new insights in the areas of social and cognitive 
psychology and brain development suggest that there may be a “third 
way” that escapes some of the most difficult criticisms of both the 
strong free speech and the procensorship positions and that incorpo-
rates some of the most important insights of each. 
 Scholars who argue in favor of hate speech restrictions have been 
characterized as strong social constructionists8 who believe that 
group-based identities—for example, race and gender—arise not from 
any inherent traits of individuals but rather from social meanings 
that are created by the words and actions of others.9 Thus, critical 
race theorists generally assert that racist hate speech, along with oth-
er social and cultural mechanisms, works to construct minorities as 
inferior and subordinated, thus launching a self-fulfilling cycle of dis-
crimination and inequality.10 Similarly, antipornography feminists in 
                                                                                                                     
2007) (granting preliminary injunction, on First Amendment overbreadth grounds, against 
enforcement of university speech code provisions that empowered the university to punish 
students for behavior that was not “civil” or was “inconsistent with [the university’s] goals”); 
Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 872-73 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (holding that university 
speech code was overbroad); Bair v. Shippensburg Univ., 280 F. Supp. 2d 357, 372-73 (M.D. 
Pa. 2003) (granting preliminary injunction in favor of student challenging university speech 
code based on finding that code was facially overbroad); Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 39 F. 
Supp. 477, 482-84 (1993) (holding speech code, under which basketball coach was disci-
plined for using a racial epithet, violated the First Amendment); UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of 
Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1178-81 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (finding univer-
sity rule prohibiting discriminatory epithets overbroad and unduly vague); Doe v. Univ. of 
Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 866-67 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding university antidiscrimination 
code unconstitutional). Nonetheless, institutions continue to maintain their codes and, in 
many cases, to strengthen them. See Jon B. Gould, The Precedent That Wasn’t: College Hate 
Speech Codes and the Two Faces of Legal Compliance, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 345, 345, 357-
59 (2001) [hereinafter Gould, College Hate Speech Codes] (finding, in an empirical investiga-
tion, that many colleges and universities—both public and private—continue to enact or 
maintain hate speech codes despite court decisions striking down similar codes as unconsti-
tutional); see also JON B. GOULD, SPEAK NO EVIL: THE TRIUMPH OF HATE SPEECH 
REGULATION (2005) (examining in detail the implications of his empirical findings). In addi-
tion, because private universities are not subject to First Amendment constraints, they have 
room to experiment in the delicate balancing between freedom of speech and promotion       
of equality. 
 8. See Gey, supra note 2, at 198 (arguing that “[t]he social constructionist argument is 
perhaps the clearest thread linking the various groups proposing new theories to justify 
speech regulation”). 
 9. See, e.g., IAN HACKING, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? 1 (1999) (containing 
an alphabetical listing of traits and other things said to be socially constructed, including 
gender, facts, illness, reality, and serial homicide). For an account of the social construction-
ist position in the context of gender, see Julie A. Seaman, Form and (Dys)Function in Sexual 
Harassment Law: Biology, Culture, and the Spandrels of Title VII, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 321, 
355-61 (2005). 
 10. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 5, at 26-27 (“Words play a central role in 
the creation of all these hurdles [that minorities endure in society] . . . . [I]t is racial depic-
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the tradition of Catharine MacKinnon argue that gender is socially 
constructed and that violent or degrading sexual depictions both cre-
ate and perpetuate a society in which individuals understand women 
as objects of male sexual desire and agency.11 
 In contrast, traditional free speech theorists tend to reject this vi-
sion of false consciousness on the part of individual citizens who can-
not know their “true” desires or beliefs.12 Indeed, all of the dominant 
theories of the First Amendment rest upon the assumption of an au-
tonomous subject who is free to weigh and choose among competing 
ideas in some nontrivial manner.13 
 Notwithstanding this profound disagreement about the respective 
roles of the individual and of society in shaping identity, I suspect nei-
ther side would quarrel with the commonplace observation that indi-
                                                                                                                     
tion and imagery that maintain the system of white-over-black in this society, now that 
those more tangible barriers [of slavery and Jim Crow] have been lowered.”); see also 
JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 5 (1997) (“[I]t is by 
being interpellated within the terms of language that a certain social existence of the body 
first becomes possible.”). 
 11. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 13 (1993) (“Social inequality is sub-
stantially created and enforced—that is, done—through words and images . . . . Elevation 
and denigration are all accomplished through meaningful symbols and communicative acts 
in which saying it is doing it.”). MacKinnon and other radical feminists have defined “por-
nography” very specifically as both broader and narrower than the unprotected category 
“obscenity.” Under the proposed antipornography ordinance drafted by MacKinnon and An-
drea Dworkin, pornography is defined as: 
[T]he graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures or in 
words, that also includes . . . [w]omen [who] are presented as[:] sexual objects 
who enjoy pain or humiliation; . . . experience sexual pleasure in being raped; . . . 
tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt[;] . . . being pene-
trated by objects or animals; . . . and . . . in scenarios of degradation, injury, ab-
asement, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a con-
text that makes these conditions sexual . . . . 
Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 324 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting Indianapolis 
Code § 16-3(q)). MacKinnon views pornography, as defined in the model antipornography 
ordinance, as a variety of hate speech against women. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra, at 104 
(“Hate speech and pornography do the same thing: enact the abuse.”). In contrast, the Su-
preme Court’s definition of obscenity, which is unprotected speech under First Amendment 
doctrine, turns not on its depiction of subordination but rather on the sexual explicitness 
and prurience of the expression. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1973). 
 12. See NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE 
FIGHT FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS 114 (1995) (rejecting Catharine MacKinnon’s notion of false 
consciousness as paternalistic and subordinating of women). 
 13. For example, the marketplace rationale requires a genuine “consumer” of ideas 
such that the speech that prevails in the marketplace can be said to reflect the truest or 
most useful ideas; an assumption of false consciousness undermines the marketplace model 
in speech theory as in economic theory. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Likewise, the self-governance rationale of the First Amend-
ment posits citizens capable of deliberative democratic choice. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, 
FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). And the personal autonomy 
rationale for protection of freedom of speech requires an individual able to exercise the de-
sired autonomy. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL        
ENQUIRY (1982). 
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vidual behavior is to some extent influenced by the larger social con-
text in which it occurs.14 That larger context includes other people, in-
stitutional culture and architecture, social norms, legal rules, and 
physical features of the environment. Indeed, law would have little 
purpose absent the assumption that human behavior tends to mold to 
its shape.15 Humans are social animals; our behavior is impacted by 
the rules and other social cues present in our environment. 
 Decades of research in social psychology have demonstrated that 
individual behavior is strongly influenced by situation, and that dis-
position (an individual’s “character” or “personality”) does not have as 
strong an influence as people generally believe.16 In addition, numer-
ous experiments performed over the past twenty years make clear 
that when certain social identity characteristics are “primed,” indi-
vidual behavior and decisionmaking are unconsciously affected in 
measurable ways.17 Finally, findings in developmental psychology and 
neuropsychology suggest that there may be good reason to treat col-
lege-age individuals differently than older adults.18 
 The exceedingly modest proposal19 of this Essay is that universities 
can, and should, consider ways in which to structure their social and 
physical environments so as to minimize harmful antisocial speech 
and to maximize prosocial, productive speech.20 Rather than prohibit 
                                                                                                                     
 14. The importance of situational factors to behavior is a commonplace belief among 
psychologists, though people in general tend to minimize the role of situation relative to 
disposition. See Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide: How Di-
vergent Views of Human Behavior Are Shaping Legal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311, 321-22 
(2008). To the extent that one believes that behavior is independent of situational factors, 
this Essay’s proposal should not be objectionable, but merely ineffectual. 
 15. Cf. Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage: Be-
havioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1141, 1187 (2001) (“We can 
usefully consider law to be a lever for moving human behavior in directions it would not go 
on its own.”). 
 16. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational 
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 
165-66 (2003) (summarizing social psychological literature showing that situation, rather 
than disposition, is the crucial factor driving human behavior). Though well accepted in psy-
chology literature, the importance of situation relative to disposition has been underappre-
ciated in the legal academic literature. See Benforado & Hanson, supra note 14, at 315 (not-
ing that “one purpose of the critical realist project . . . is to encourage and expedite th[e] 
process” of disseminating situationalist research among legal academics and policy-makers).  
 17. For a recent overview and synthesis of the research, see Ap Dijksterhuis et al., Ef-
fects of Priming and Perception on Social Behavior and Goal Pursuit, in SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: THE AUTOMATICITY OF HIGHER MENTAL PROCESSES 51 
(John A. Bargh ed., 2007) [hereinafter Dijksterhuis et al., Effects of Priming]. 
 18. See Jennifer Ann Drobac, “Developing Capacity”: Adolescent “Consent” at Work, at 
Law, and in the Sciences of the Mind, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 19 (2006) (summa-
rizing neuroscientific findings on adolescent brain development and noting that “[t]his new 
research confirms that adolescent brain development extends into the twenties”). 
 19. Cf. Strossen, supra note 2, at 484. 
 20. Such features would also be likely to influence nonspeech behavior in a similar di-
rection. In addition, most of the general ideas presented here—though not the specific de-
tails—could apply in other institutional contexts such as workplaces or prisons. 
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hate speech or punish it after it occurs,21 universities should take 
steps to create and foster a social and physical atmosphere in which it 
becomes less likely that hate speech will occur in the first place.22 
Such an approach would recognize the social constructionist insight 
that belief and behavior are profoundly influenced—often uncon-
sciously—by cultural practices, language,23 and images. At the same 
time, it would avoid the heavy-handed censorship which is most objec-
tionable to civil libertarians.24 
  Following this Introduction, Part II sets out the distinctive fea-
tures of the university environment that make it a unique—and po-
tentially very fruitful—forum in which to experiment with strategies 
to encourage prosocial behavior and thereby reduce antisocial speech, 
including hate speech. Part III describes recent work in the field of so-
                                                                                                                     
 21. I do not specifically address in this Essay hate crimes or hate speech that the First 
Amendment would not protect, such as threats directed at individuals. Though the premise 
of the Essay is that these would also become less common and less violent and aggressive in 
a more prosocial environment, those unprotected acts or speech that still occur could—and 
should—be punished under established First Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., Virginia v. 
Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (stating that threats of violence directed at a particular per-
son or group and intended to “plac[e] the victim in fear of bodily harm or death” may be pun-
ished as unprotected speech); Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 490 (1993) (holding that a 
sentence enhancement for bias crimes did not violate the Defendant’s free speech rights); 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (suggesting that sexually harassing 
speech may constitutionally be regulated because it “violate[s] laws directed not against 
speech but against conduct”). I should also point out that there are additional ways an insti-
tution might deal with hate speech incidents besides prohibition and punishment. As Pro-
fessor Calleros has argued, an incident can serve as the impetus for education, advocacy, 
and empowerment even if—or perhaps because—it is not subject to formal disciplinary pro-
cedures. See Charles R. Calleros, Paternalism, Counterspeech, and Campus Hate-Speech 
Codes: A Reply to Delgado and Yun, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1249, 1256-63 (1995). 
 22. This was the strategy recommended by a commission at the University of Pennsyl-
vania that was charged with examining the University’s policies in the wake of the so-called 
“water buffalo” incident in the early 1990’s. See COMM’N ON STRENGTHENING THE CMTY., 
UNIV. OF PA., FINAL REPORT: COMMISSION ON STRENGTHENING THE COMMUNITY (1994), 
http://www.upenn.edu/almanac/issues/past/strength_community_report.html [hereinafter 
FINAL REPORT]. 
 23. There is an ongoing debate among linguists and social theorists concerning the de-
gree to which language influences thought, or vice versa. See Seaman, supra note 9, at 412 
n.288. Recent studies seem to support the “Whorfian” position that language does have a 
role in shaping perception. See Christine Kenneally, When Language Can Hold the Answer, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2008, at F1 (citing and describing several recent studies). 
 24. In a recent article, two scholars who have been prominent in bringing the situ-
ational model of human behavior to a legal academic audience noted the close correlations 
between political conservatism and dispositionism on the one hand and political liberalism 
and situationism on the other. See Benforado & Hanson, supra note 14, at 382-99. Generally 
speaking, political conservatives tend to attribute outcomes to disposition (personality), 
whereas political liberals tend to attribute outcomes to situation (outside forces). See id. In 
line with these observations, it would be expected that strong free speech proponents would 
tend to have a dispositional view of human behavior while proponents of hate speech regu-
lation would tend to have a more situational view. Rather than enter the attitudinal fray, I 
prefer to emphasize that if the situational view were to turn out to be incorrect or mis-
guided, the policy proposals suggested here would, for the most part, simply be ineffectual 
and not pernicious. With that said, much research demonstrates that subtle situational fea-
tures can have significant effects on behavior. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
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cial psychology that supports the view that individual behavior re-
sponds strongly to situational cues. In particular, this Part focuses on 
the deindividuation and priming literatures to demonstrate that sub-
tle changes in environment can result in significant shifts in thought 
and behavior. In Part IV, the Essay concludes by offering some pre-
liminary ideas as to what steps institutions might explore as a way to 
shape their environments to accomplish these goals. 
II.   HATE SPEECH AND THE UNIVERSITY 
 The university environment is distinctive for a number of reasons. 
First, only public institutions are technically bound to comply with 
the dictates of the First Amendment, even though many private insti-
tutions profess a commitment to adhere to its principles.25 This allows 
private colleges and universities some degree of leeway in choosing 
how best to respond to hate speech. Second, the principle of academic 
freedom may alter the First Amendment analysis that applies to pub-
lic universities as compared to other state actors.26 Third, from the 
perspective of developmental psychology, the typical university stu-
dent is not a child, nor is he or she27 fully an adult. There is substan-
tial evidence that the average human brain does not reach its full 
                                                                                                                     
 25. Note that California schools are bound by state law to adhere to the First Amend-
ment, and Stanford’s hate speech code was struck down as unconstitutional under this state 
scheme. See Corry v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., No. 740309 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 
1995) (holding that California’s Leonard Law, Education Code section 94367, permitted 
plaintiffs to challenge free speech violation by private university notwithstanding the state 
action doctrine), available at http://www.ithaca.edu/faculty/cduncan/265/corryvstanford.htm. 
 26. A glance through the many cases collected and reported on the website of the 
Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, http://www.thefire.org, reveals that class-
room speech by faculty members is often a target of enforcement under hate speech codes. 
In such situations, the crosscurrents of free speech and academic freedom protections result 
in a complicated puzzle. See Frederick Schauer, Is There a Right to Academic Freedom?, 77 
U. COLO. L. REV. 907, 908 (2006) (“Although it is surely correct that there are robust consti-
tutional rights to freedom of speech, freedom of association, and the free exercise of religion, 
to take just a small number of pertinent examples, the doctrinal, conceptual, and normative 
issues surrounding the idea of academic freedom are far murkier.”). See generally J. Peter 
Byrne, Constitutional Academic Freedom After Grutter: Getting Real About the “Four Free-
doms” of a University, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 929 (2006) (describing development and contours 
of constitutional academic freedom doctrine and evaluating the impact of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), upon the doctrine); Smolla, su-
pra note 1, at 216-24 (discussing concept of academic freedom in the context of campus hate 
speech regulation and arguing that a public university constitutionally could proscribe a 
professor’s racist, sexist, or homophobic hate speech in the classroom but not in the open fo-
rums on the campus); R. George Wright, The Emergence of First Amendment Academic 
Freedom, 85 NEB. L. REV. 793, 793 (2007) (noting that “[t]he idea of a constitutionally pro-
tected realm of academic freedom is controversial and judicially unsettled” and proposing 
that state restrictions of academic freedom generally be subject to strict scrutiny). 
 27. There is some evidence that the pronoun matters in this context; development is 
not, on average, identically timed for males and females. See Evelyn K. Lambe, Dyslexia, 
Gender, and Brain Imaging, 37 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 521 (1999); Deborah P. Waber, Sex Dif-
ferences in Cognition: A Function of Maturation Rate?, 192 SCIENCE 572 (1976). The gender 
implications of the argument, however, are well beyond the scope of this Essay. 
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moral or cognitive maturity until individuals are in their mid-
twenties.28 To the extent that most college students are in their late 
teens and early twenties, some arguments on either side of the hate 
speech debate might apply differently to them. Fourth, because of the 
relatively contained nature of university life, modifications of the en-
vironment to encourage prosocial behavior are more practicable than 
they would be, for example, on the Internet or in the public square.29 
And finally, the special mission of the university might in some cases 
justify institutional behavior that would be less supportable outside 
the collegiate gates.30 For these reasons, this Essay focuses on the 
university as a somewhat special case in considering the arguments 
for and against hate speech codes and in considering the actions a 
university might take in an attempt to minimize hate speech             
on campus. 
 Public university hate speech restrictions that have been chal-
lenged in court have been decisively struck down on First Amendment 
grounds.31 In addition, as noted above, most private institutions insist 
rather vociferously that they are committed to upholding freedom of 
speech on campus and that they will therefore follow the dictates of 
the First Amendment although they are not legally bound to do so.32 
However, a comprehensive empirical examination by Professor Jon 
Gould of the practices of both public and private institutions, per-
formed after the federal court decisions striking down campus hate 
speech regulations, has revealed that a large percentage of institu-
tions adopt strategies of noncompliance, either passive or active.33 In 
exploring the paradox of institutions’ stated intent to adhere to First                         
Amendment doctrine contrasted with actions that had precisely the 
                                                                                                                     
 28. See infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text. 
 29. It may be more difficult (practically, if not legally) for public universities to imple-
ment structural or other changes to affect the nature of the speech of members of the gen-
eral public who come onto campus to distribute literature or otherwise participate in debate. 
Recently, for example, Emory University decided to restrict admission to a talk given by a 
controversial speaker because of disruption at an earlier event by individuals not affiliated 
with the university. See Salvador Rizzo, Outside Group Stifles Horowitz Speech, 
EMORYWHEEL.COM, Oct. 25, 2007, http://www.emorywheel.com/detail.php?n=24510. 
 30. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 16 F. Supp. 2d 797 (E.D. Mich. 1998). 
 31. See Bair v. Shippensburg Univ., 280 F. Supp. 2d 357, 372 (M.D. Pa. 2003); Dambrot 
v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 839 F. Supp. 477, 482 (E.D. Mich. 1993); UWM Post v. Bd. of Regents, 
774 F. Supp. 1163, 1177 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 866-67 
(E.D. Mich. 1989); see also Corry v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., No. 740309 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Feb. 27, 1995), available at http://www.ithaca.edu/faculty/cduncan/265/corryvstanford.htm. 
 32. See Gould, College Hate Speech Codes, supra note 7; Smolla, supra note 1. Note, 
however, that there are arguments that private universities may be contractually bound 
based upon statements in student handbooks or other literature. See FIRE – Foundation for 
Individual Rights in Education, http://www.thefire.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). 
 33. Gould distinguished between those institutions that left existing hate speech re-
strictions in place—which he characterized as passive noncompliers—and those which actu-
ally enacted new or more restrictive codes following the court decisions—which he charac-
terized as active noncompliers. See Gould, College Hate Speech Codes, supra note 7, at 365. 
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opposite effect, Professor Gould discovered that the reasons that uni-
versities kept or created hate speech codes were multifaceted. In some 
cases, administrators decided that eliminating even an unconstitu-
tional code would send a signal to minorities on campus that they 
were not valued members of the academic community.34 In addition, 
several university leaders suggested in interviews that they had 
weighed the likely public relations effects of eliminating the codes 
against an unstated policy of nonenforcement.35 In other words, ad-
ministrators sometimes chose to keep the codes in place as a symbol of 
their commitment to equality and nondiscrimination, while at the 
same time pursuing an unwritten policy of underenforcement or 
nonenforcement so as not to make First Amendment waves in          
the media.36 
 Administrators, it seems, are keenly aware of the symbolic value of 
having in place strong policies against racist (and other forms of) hate 
speech. As Professor Mari Matsuda argued in an influential early ar-
ticle, “[i]n a society that expresses its moral judgments through the 
law, and in which the rule of law and the use of law are characteristic 
responses to many social phenomena, [the] absence of laws against 
racist speech is telling.”37 Critical race theorists describe at least two 
distinct harms of hate speech: the harm that flows from the hate 
speech itself and the second-order harm that results from official tol-
erance of the speech.38 Hate speech codes attempt to reduce the first 
                                                                                                                     
 34. See id. at 371-75; see also Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. at 864-65. 
 35. See Gould, College Hate Speech Codes, supra note 7, at 371-75. 
 36. See id. Universities are apt to receive unwelcome media attention when an appar-
ent hate speech incident occurs, no matter what response they pursue. For example, in the 
aftermath of the “water buffalo” incident at the University of Pennsylvania, the University 
was condemned for being the site of the speech and then again for its handling of the disci-
plinary proceeding against the student who uttered the remark. See Elizabeth Rossi, After-
math, Consequences of Decade-Old Water Buffalo Affair, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN, Apr. 18, 
2003 (stating that the handling of this and a related incident “brought national attention to 
Penn, and then-University President Sheldon Hackney and other administrators were ac-
cused of what many critics called political correctness run amuck”). The social consequences 
in terms of intergroup relations of the media coverage and the ensuing debate are arguably 
worse than those of the incident itself. But see Calleros, supra note 21, at 1256-63 (arguing 
that racist incidents on campus can serve as a “wake-up call” that may ultimately lead to 
empowerment, dialogue, and mutual understanding). 
 37. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2379; see also Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Func-
tion of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996). Similar to feminist arguments for rape law re-
form in the 1970s, Professor Matsuda argued that “the law’s failure to provide recourse to 
persons who are demeaned by the hate messages is an effective second injury to that person 
. . . the pain of knowing that the government provides no remedy, and offers no recognition 
of the dehumanizing experience that victims of hate propaganda are subjected to.” Matsuda, 
supra note 1, at 2379. In an addendum to its decision in University of Michigan, the district 
court noted that it had become aware of the Matsuda article, delivered to chambers the very 
day that the decision was issued, just after its original opinion had been filed. Univ. of 
Mich., 721 F. Supp. at 869. The court praised Matsuda’s article and stated that “[a]n earlier 
awareness of Professor Matsuda’s paper certainly would have sharpened the Court’s view of 
the issues.” Id. 
 38. According to Professor Matsuda: 
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kind of harm through deterrence and the second by their very exis-
tence and enforcement. Indeed, some scholars have argued that this 
second function is more important. Henry Louis Gates, Jr. has written 
that 
the main appeal of speech codes usually turns out to be primarily 
expressive or symbolic rather than consequential in nature. That is, 
their advocates do not depend on the claim that the statute will 
spare victim groups some foreseeable amount of psychic trauma. 
They say, rather, that by adopting such a statute, the university ex-
presses its opposition to hate speech and bigotry.39  
 Among the most powerful arguments in favor of hate speech re-
strictions are those that stress that the harms caused by racist, sexist, 
and antigay hate speech are genuine, severe, and not recognized or 
considered sufficiently weighty by American law and society.40 As Ma-
tsuda points out, “[t]olerance of hate speech is not tolerance borne by 
the community at large. Rather, it is a psychic tax imposed on those 
least able to pay.”41 Professor Richard Delgado has also catalogued at 
length the physical and psychological harms suffered by victims of 
racist hate speech and has argued that these harms can have perva-
                                                                                                                     
To be hated, despised, and alone is the ultimate fear of all human beings. How-
ever irrational racist speech may be, it hits right at the emotional place where 
we feel the most pain. The aloneness comes not only from the hate message it-
self, but also from the government response of tolerance. 
Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2338. 
 39. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., War of Words: Critical Race Theory and the First Amend-
ment, in SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX: HATE SPEECH, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES 17, 38 (1994) (arguing that hate speech codes are misguided); see also Univ. of 
Mich., 721 F. Supp. at 855 (quoting Acting University President’s statement that adoption 
of a hate speech policy “ ‘would enable the University to take the position that it was willing 
to do something about this issue [of racial harassment on campus]’ ”). On the other hand, as 
noted above, universities also wish to express their commitment to academic freedom and 
freedom of speech. A view of hate speech codes that understands them primarily as expres-
sive or symbolic in nature raises complicated issues of academic freedom of the institution 
and, in the case of public universities, of the permissible scope of government speech. Of 
course, an institution could express its abhorrence of racist and sexist hate speech without 
purporting to restrict or punish such speech. 
 40. See, e.g., DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 5, at 11-18; ALEXANDER TSESIS, 
DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: HOW HATE SPEECH PAVES THE WAY FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS (2002); Delgado, Words That Wound, supra note 3, at 135-49; Lawrence, supra 
note 5, at 457-76; Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2326-41; Nielsen, supra note 3 (study measur-
ing the nature, amount, and harms of racist and sexist remarks in public); cf. LEE C. 
BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 18-21 (1986) (describing Wigmore’s reaction to Justice 
Holmes’s famous dissent in Abrams v. United States and in particular Wigmore’s concern 
that in asserting a strong free speech principle protecting extremist speech Holmes “had 
grossly minimized the risk to the country from the defendants’ speech”). 
 41. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2323; see also Nielsen, supra note 3, at 279 (“There can 
be little doubt that members of traditionally disadvantaged groups face a strikingly differ-
ent reality on the street than do members of privileged groups.”). 
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sive and long-term effects upon the person’s well-being.42 To the ex-
tent that institutions of higher education have a special responsibility 
to protect the physical, emotional, and psychological health of their 
students, the existence of these potential harms—and a recognition by 
the university that they are real and are serious—becomes increas-
ingly relevant to the hate speech debate. 
 In addition to this focus on the victims of hate speech, the univer-
sity context affords a special opportunity to examine the speaker side 
of the hate speech equation. While context is undoubtedly relevant in 
evaluating the listener side43—and the university context arguably 
would support greater restrictions on speech for the purpose of ensur-
ing equality of educational opportunity–on the speaker side, a univer-
sity offers the special case in which speakers—whether fellow stu-
dents or faculty—also have a particular demographic and a distinctive 
institutional role. Under these circumstances, the familiar First 
Amendment arguments might play out in a slightly different way. 
 It is well-settled that children do not enjoy the same level of consti-
tutional protection of their freedom of speech as do adults.44 In the 
educational context, though students do not “shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”45 
their interests in expression46 must be balanced against the interests 
                                                                                                                     
 42. Professor Delgado argues that “[t]he person who is timid, withdrawn, bitter, hyper-
tense, or psychotic [as a consequence of being subjected to hate speech] will almost certainly 
fare poorly in employment settings.” Delgado, Words That Wound, supra note 3, at 139. In 
response to Delgado’s argument, Professor Gates quipped, “As a member of the Harvard 
faculty, I would venture there are exceptions to this rule.” Gates, supra note 39, at 24. 
 43. For example, speech restrictions in the workplace have been permitted in order to 
ensure equal employment opportunity under Title VII, though it is difficult in principle to 
distinguish them from similar speech restrictions in other contexts. See R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Kingsley R. Browne, Zero Tolerance for the First Amendment: Ti-
tle VII’s Regulation of Employee Speech, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 563 (2001); Kingsley R. 
Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First Amend-
ment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481 (1991); Eugene Volokh, Deterring Speech: When is it “McCarthy-
ism”? When is it Proper?, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1416 (2005) [hereinafter Volokh, Deterring 
Speech]; Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does “Hostile Work Environment” Harassment Law 
Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627 (1997); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Appellate Review 
in Workplace Harassment Cases, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1009 (1996). 
 44. E.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007) (“[W]e have held that ‘the 
constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the 
rights of adults in other settings,’ and that the rights of students ‘must be applied in light of 
the special characteristics of the school environment.’ ” (citation omitted)); FCC. v. Pacifica 
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 757 (1978) (noting that it is permissible to restrict children’s access to 
speech that would be protected as to adults because “a child . . . is not possessed of that full 
capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees” 
(quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring))). 
 45. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 46. Students’ privacy interests are similarly constrained relative to adult citizens. See 
Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 
(2002) (holding that policy requiring all students who participated in competitive extracur-
ricular activities to submit to suspicionless drug testing did not violate Fourth Amendment 
ban on unreasonable searches); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995) 
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of the state acting as parens patriae47 and the interests of other stu-
dents in the educational environment.48 University students, however, 
have traditionally been treated as adults for purposes of First 
Amendment analysis.49 
 A growing body of research suggests, however, that significant 
brain development continues into the early- and mid-twenties—that 
is, into the typical college years of most undergraduate and even 
graduate students. “The relatively recent discovery that brain devel-
opment continues into adulthood has turned the conventional wisdom 
that the brain is fully developed by early childhood on its head.”50 This 
relatively late brain development is concentrated in areas of the brain 
that involve executive function, including moral decisionmaking, im-
pulse inhibition, and reasoning about the consequences of one’s ac-
tions. As summed up by one legal scholar: 
[W]ork by such researchers as Piaget and (more so) Kohlberg 
showed a process of development in moral reasoning going far be-
yond early childhood. Neuroscience now provides an explanation of 
that extended period of development. While the brain may be suffi-
ciently developed for many tasks in early childhood, when it comes 
to inhibition and understanding consequences vital to moral reason-
ing, the wiring for the task is not complete.51 
Through a developmental process that has in recent years been re-
vealed by new techniques of brain imaging,52 “ ‘the teenage brain fine-
                                                                                                                     
(“ ‘[S]tudents within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than mem-
bers of the population generally.’ ” (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985))). 
 47. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654. The Court stated:  
Traditionally at common law, and still today, unemancipated minors lack some 
of the most fundamental rights of self-determination—including even the right 
of liberty in its narrow sense, i.e., the right to come and go at will. They are sub-
ject, even as to their physical freedom, to the control of their parents or guardi-
ans.  
Id. Public schools, according to the Court, both stand in loco parentis to minor 
children as well as exercise the power of the state. Id. at 654-55. 
 48. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (stating that a school may restrict student speech when it 
has reason to believe that such expression will “impinge upon the rights of other students”). 
 49. According to Professor Eugene Volokh, “[t]he government acting as college educator 
is generally assumed by recent lower court cases to have no greater powers than the gov-
ernment acting as sovereign,” though “there has been no square Supreme Court holding” on 
the question. EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES 379 (3d ed. 
2008). 
 50. Kenneth J. King, Waiving Childhood Goodbye: How Juvenile Courts Fail to Protect 
Children from Unknowing, Unintelligent, and Involuntary Waivers of Miranda Rights, 2006 
WIS. L. REV. 431, 437 n.24. 
 51. Kevin W. Saunders, A Disconnect Between Law and Neuroscience: Modern Brain 
Science, Media Influences, and Juvenile Justice, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 695, 712 (citation omit-
ted). 
 52. The development of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has revolution-
ized brain science in recent years, allowing researchers to observe subjects’ brains as they 
perform cognitive and motor tasks and to see which areas of the brain are differentially 
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tunes its most human part, the prefrontal cortex, the place that helps 
us cast a wary eye, link cause to effect, decide ‘maybe not’—the part, 
in fact, that acts grown-up.’ The process takes place not only in the 
teen years, but into the twenties.”53 
 Furthermore, adolescents in the midst of this rapid prefrontal de-
velopment are also more susceptible than fully mature adults to cues 
from social groups with which they self-identify.54 Individuals who are 
in the midst of this late teen/early adult developmental phase “are 
less self-reliant and more influenced . . . by others.”55 Because of this 
heightened sensitivity to the judgments and values of the social 
groups with which they identify, it is even more likely that situational 
cues will have an effect on students’ behavior.56 
 In sum, because of their neural, social, cognitive, educational, and 
moral developmental stage, college students as a group are probably 
more likely than older adults to engage in antisocial behavior where 
situational factors lead them in that direction, but they are also more 
likely to respond to situational and social cues that would tend to lead 
them instead toward prosocial behavior. From the perspective of the 
First Amendment, it is defensible to argue that postsecondary student 
speech, at least within the university context, should be subject to 
somewhat more regulation than the speech of fully mature adults. 
Thus, universities should be permitted some room to experiment with 
situational manipulation in order to encourage prosocial behavior and 
to discourage antisocial behavior and speech, including hate speech. 
The following Part describes the social science research that suggests 
why situational manipulation of this sort might be successful. 
                                                                                                                     
“working.” See Jay N. Geidd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and Adolescence: A 
Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861 (1999); Tomáš Paus, Mapping 
Brain Maturation and Cognitive Development During Adolescence, 9 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 
60 (2005); Julie A. Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (detailing recent 
advances in functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI)). 
 53. Saunders, supra note 51, at 710 (quoting BARBARA STRAUCH, THE PRIMAL TEEN: 
WHAT THE NEW DISCOVERIES ABOUT THE TEENAGE BRAIN TELL US ABOUT OUR KIDS 203-04 
(2003)). 
 54. In other words, they are more susceptible to peer pressure. See Drobac, supra note 
18, at 28-29; Cass R. Sunstein, Adolescent Risk-Taking and Social Meaning: A Commentary 
2-3 (John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 386 (2d series), 2008, Public Law and 
Legal Theory Working Paper No. 198, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id= 
1087144. 
 55. Drobac, supra note 18, at 29. 
 56. Much research in the fields of social and cognitive psychology is done using stu-
dents—often undergraduates—as subjects. This common feature of the experimental design 
is sometimes criticized for the very reason that it is not clear how results will generalize 
outside of this population. However, for the purposes of the analysis presented in this Es-
say, it is especially felicitous. 
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III.   SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: INDIVIDUALS, GROUPS, AND BEHAVIOR 
 The field of social psychology offers a host of insights into human 
attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors. Many studies performed in re-
cent years support the proposition that situational elements—the 
physical, institutional, social, cultural and linguistic environment in 
which a person is situated—affect individual thought and action in 
measurable and fairly predictable ways. In particular, this Part de-
scribes research in the areas of deindividuation and priming, and it 
proposes that these two literatures complement one another and sug-
gest potentially fruitful avenues by which universities could encour-
age prosocial speech and behavior. 
A.   Deindividuation Theory and the Psychology of Anonymity  
 Psychologists (and others) have long been interested in the ques-
tion of what drives individuals to behave in either prosocial or          
antisocial ways. More specifically, many social commentators have no-
ticed that individuals in groups often behave differently—and worse—
than individuals acting alone.57 Beginning with the 1952 publication 
of a classic paper on the subject, the predominant framework for un-
derstanding so-called mob behavior has been the theory of “deindi-
viduation.”58 Social psychologist Leon Festinger59 hypothesized that 
when individuals are “submerged in the group,” they experience a re-
laxation of inhibition and social restraint and are more apt to act    
antisocially.60 Somewhat paradoxically, according to this theory,       
individuals in groups feel more anonymous than when they are alone; 
that feeling of relative anonymity—or deindividuation—leads to        
antinormative behavior.61 
 In the years since Festinger’s article was published, numerous 
studies have sought to explain the behavior of individuals within 
groups and to identify the factors that contribute to socially destruc-
                                                                                                                     
 57. See Tom Postmes, Deindividuation, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
233 (Roy F. Baumeister & Kathleen D. Vohs eds., 2007) (tracing deindividuation theory to 
the classic 1895 book La Foule (The Crowd), by Gustave Le Bon); see also NATHANAEL WEST, 
THE DAY OF THE LOCUST (1950). 
 58. See L. Festinger et al., Some Consequences of De-Individuation in a Group, 47 J. 
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 382, 382 (1952). 
 59. Festinger is especially well known for introducing the theory of cognitive disso-
nance. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). 
 60. Festinger et al., supra note 58, at 382. 
 61. The social psychology literature refers to aggressive, dishonest, or otherwise unde-
sirable behavior as antinormative, in that it contravenes generally accepted social norms. 
However, this label is problematic; more recent research suggests that the behavior may in 
fact be normative with respect to the smaller group, though it is antinormative with respect 
to the larger group. See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. 
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tive dynamics.62 Though there has at times been disagreement about 
the explanation for observed correlations between certain situational 
features and antisocial behaviors, there is little dispute that the      
correlations exist.63 The most persistent connection across many stud-
ies has been between anonymity of various kinds or degrees and 
changes in behavior. Thus, when researchers manipulate the extent to 
which subjects perceive themselves as individuals versus as members 
of groups, the behavior of the subjects change, sometimes                
dramatically so. 
 In The Lucifer Effect, social psychologist Philip Zimbardo examined 
forty years of empirical research to conclude that context is critically 
important in shaping behavior.64 Decades of research have demon-
strated that certain situational factors strongly predict the likelihood 
of antinormative behavior. In particular, social psychologists have 
long recognized the critical importance of identifiability versus ano-
nymity as a factor influencing behavior.65 Countless laboratory and 
field studies, beginning with Zimbardo’s infamous Stanford Prison 
Experiment in 1971 and continuing to the present with studies of 
internet speech and behavior, have demonstrated that a feeling of 
anonymity can often increase—even cause—aggressive, disturbing, 
and antisocial behavior, including speech.66 
                                                                                                                     
 62. For purposes of this discussion, I make what I hope is the uncontroversial assump-
tion that aggression, violence, sadism, degradation of another person, racism, and behavior 
that generally falls under the rubric of “hate speech” is antisocial and undesirable. 
 63. But see Tom Postmes & Russell Spears, Deindividuation and Antinormative Behav-
ior: A Meta-Analysis, 123 PSYCHOL. BULL. 238 (1998) (noting the anomalies in the research 
and proposing refinements to the theory) [hereinafter Postmes & Spears, A Meta-Analysis]. 
 64. See PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE 
TURN EVIL (2007). 
 65.  See Katelyn Y. A. McKenna & John A. Bargh, Plan 9 From Cyberspace: The Impli-
cations of the Internet for Personality and Social Psychology, 4 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. REV. 57, 61-62 (2000) (summarizing literature on deindividuation and stating that 
deindividuation, “as through anonymity . . . decreases the influence of internal (i.e., self) 
standards of or guides to behavior, and increases the power of external, situational cues”). 
 66. The distinction between “speech” (for First Amendment purposes) and conduct is 
notoriously thorny. Some nonverbal conduct—such as flag-burning—is protected as “sym-
bolic speech,” while some verbal or written utterances—such as threats, bribes, or revealing 
state secrets—are often said to lack First Amendment protection because they are not really 
speech but instead are akin to conduct. See generally Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: 
Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and 
the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277 (2005). The debate over the constitutionality 
and desirability of regulating hate speech has highlighted this issue, with proponents of 
hate speech regulation often likening hate speech to physical assault. See, e.g., Richard 
Delgado, Are Hate-Speech Rules Constitutional Heresy? A Reply to Steven Gey, 146 U. PA. L. 
REV. 865, 872 (1998) (“Face-to-face hate speech conveys no information. It is more like a 
slap in the face or a performative . . . .”); Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2332 (“In addition to 
physical violence, there is the violence of the word. Racist hate messages, threats, slurs, epi-
thets, and disparagement all hit the gut of those in the target group.”). Putting aside this 
debate under the First Amendment, however, for purposes of this Essay the operative point 
is simply that within social psychology, speech is treated as a type of behavior. 
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 In the Stanford Prison Experiment, subjects who were by all ac-
counts average, well-adjusted, and well-educated67 young men were 
randomly assigned to play the roles either of prisoners or of prison 
guards for a two-week study of the psychology of imprisonment. With-
in the first week, the study was called off as the behavior of the 
“guards” toward the “prisoners” became increasingly abusive, aggres-
sive, violent, and sadistic and the “prisoners” began to experience se-
vere emotional distress.68 Notably, certain features emerged within 
the social setting of the experiment that have since been shown to cor-
relate with similarly aggressive, dehumanizing behavior toward other 
individuals. In particular, social cues that tended to minimize the in-
dividuality of the targets of the behavior—such as numbers replacing 
names, standard prison uniforms replacing individual items of cloth-
ing, and covering of the victims’ faces—were implemented by the 
“guards” at Stanford.69 Likewise, features were adopted which tended 
to minimize the individuality of the guards as well. These included 
standard military-style uniforms and silver reflecting sunglasses.70 
 This experiment, along with a substantial body of research on 
deindividuation,71 has since been widely interpreted as suggesting 
that “anything, or any situation, that makes people feel anonymous, 
as though no one knows who they are or cares to know, reduces their 
sense of personal accountability, thereby creating the potential for evil 
action.”72 From this perspective, the issue is not whether to tolerate 
                                                                                                                     
 67. See Craig Haney et al., Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison, 1 INT’L J. 
CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 69, 73 (1973); ZIMBARDO, supra note 64, at 32-33. 
 68. See ZIMBARDO, supra note 64, at 171. 
 69. See id. at 40. Zimbardo notes that, from the very beginning of the experiment and 
“[w]ithout any staff encouragement, some guards begin to make fun of the prisoners’ geni-
tals, remarking on their small penis size or laughing at their unevenly hanging                  
testicles.” Id. 
 70. Id. at 301. 
 71. “Theories of deindividuation propose that it is a psychological state of decreased 
self-evaluation and decreased evaluation apprehension causing antinormative and disinhib-
ited behavior.” Postmes & Spears, A Meta-Analysis, supra note 63, at 238 (citations omit-
ted). The theory developed from an attempt to explain observed mob behavior. See Tom 
Postmes, Deindividuation, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 57, at 
233 (“Deindividuation theory was developed to explain the violence and irrationality of the 
crowd. How does a group of seemingly normal individuals become an unruly mob? According 
to deindividuation theory, the anonymity and excitement of the crowd make individuals lose 
a sense of individual identity. As a result, crowd members cease to evaluate themselves, and 
they become irrational and irresponsible. All of this makes the crowd fickle, explosive, and 
prone to anti-normative and disinhibited behavior.”). Subsequent research has led some so-
cial psychologists to conclude that “[a]nonymity does not render people unthinkingly violent. 
Rather, anonymity increases their responsiveness to the normative cues present in their 
immediate environment.” Id. at 234. 
 72. ZIMBARDO, supra note 64, at 301; see also McKenna & Bargh, supra note 65, at 61 
(citing Zimbardo study for the proposition that the effects of anonymity “can culminate in 
impulsive and disinhibited behaviors”); Michael J. White, Counternormative Behavior as In-
fluenced by Deindividuating Conditions and Reference Group Salience, 103 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 
75, 76 (1977) (stating that “Zimbardo . . . demonstrated that anonymous college students 
were considerably more aggressive than those who were not anonymous”). 
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the few bad apples in order to preserve the liberty of the rest; rather, 
it is that certain (predictable) features of the barrel can cause even 
the good apples to go bad.73 
 A more recent refinement of deindividuation theory argues that it 
is not necessarily (or only) the anonymity per se that leads to negative 
social behaviors; rather, the crucial causal factor is the set of social 
norms associated with the particular group or subgroup with which 
the (deindividuated) subject identifies. According to this theory—
known as SIDE74—an individual constantly identifies with himself or 
herself as well as with a range of social groups; where the norms of a 
subgroup support negative behavior,75 the person who attaches sali-
ence to that subgroup identity will be more likely to behave in accor-
dance with these negative social norms. The SIDE model  
proposes that anonymity may induce a shift in focus from individ-
ual identity to social identity . . . . The principal reason for this is 
that the decreased visibility of individuality can shift the emphasis 
away from concerns about others’ individuality within the group, 
and towards the shared communalities and group concerns.76  
This social identity perspective helps to explain why some individuals 
in groups do not exhibit classic negative mob behavior; at the same 
time, the social identity focus retains the explanatory value of the 
specific variables that can affect behavior (either for good or bad) by 
decreasing the sense of individuation.77 
                                                                                                                     
 73. “[T]he bad apple-dispositional view ignores the apple barrel and its potentially cor-
rupting situational impact on those within it.” ZIMBARDO, supra note 64, at 10. Prior to the 
Stanford Prison Experiment, the prevailing wisdom regarding prison conditions was a dis-
positional view according to which, “despicable conditions, violence, brutality, dehumanisa-
tion and degradation existing within any prison can be traced to some innate or acquired 
characteristic of the correctional and inmate population.” Haney et al., supra note 67, at 70. 
 74. SIDE stands for “the social identity model of deindividuation effects.” For back-
ground and a general overview of the SIDE model and associate research, see Postmes & 
Spears, A Meta-Analysis, supra note 63, at 241-42. 
 75. As already noted, see supra note 61, it is somewhat misleading to label the behavior 
“antinormative,” since it is normative with respect to the subgroup. It is antinormative only 
with respect to some larger societal goal. In general, I assume for purposes of this discussion 
that it is both possible and appropriate to categorize some speech as undesirable, though it 
might be neither constitutional nor appropriate for the state to censor or punish it for that 
reason alone. See BOLLINGER, supra note 40, at 12 (noting the “curious disjunction” between 
Americans’ “readiness to employ a host of informal, or nonlegal, forms of coercion” against 
offensive speech and our attitude toward government censorship of the same speech); 
Eugene Volokh, Deterring Speech, supra note 43, at 1416 (“Yet as the example of social 
norms against racist speech shows, some deterrence of bad speech is socially and                
legally permissible.”). 
 76. Martin Tanis & Tom Postmes, Two Faces of Anonymity: Paradoxical Effects of Cues 
to Identity in CMC, 23 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 955, 959 (2007) (citations omitted). “CMC” 
refers to Computer Mediated Communications. Id. at 955. 
 77. Much of the recent work on deindividuation and anonymity has been done in the 
context of computer-mediated communication (CMC). See John A. Bargh & Katelyn Y. A. 
McKenna, The Internet and Social Life, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 573 (2004); Tom Postmes et 
al., Social Influence in Computer-Mediated Communication: The Effects of Anonymity on 
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B.   Social Identity and Priming 
 As the deindividuation research canvassed above suggests, both 
the level of group identification and the particular group with which a 
person identifies at a given time may influence behavior (including 
speech). Another body of experimental social psychology, which stud-
ies the so-called “priming” effect, also demonstrates the relevance of 
group identification and group trait attribution78 to individual behav-
ior as well as cognitive performance. Furthermore, as these priming 
studies make clear, the effects of social identity salience can operate 
outside of conscious awareness and can persist over time.79 
                                                                                                                     
Group Behavior, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1243 (2001); Tom Postmes & Rus-
sell Spears, Behavior Online: Does Anonymous Computer Communication Reduce Gender 
Inequality?, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1073 (2002) [hereinafter Postmes & 
Spears, Behavior Online]; Giuseppe Riva, The Sociocognitive Psychology of Computer-
Mediated Communication: The Present and Future of Technology-Based Interactions, 5 
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 581 (2002); Russell Spears et al., When Are Net Effects Gross 
Products? The Power of Influence and the Influence of Power in Computer-Mediated Com-
munication, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 91 (2002); John Suler, The Online Disinhibition Effect, 7 
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 321 (2004); Tanis & Postmes, supra note 76. As noted above, 
deindividuation theory originated in an attempt to explain mob behavior. In that context, 
the idea was that persons feel more anonymous in groups and therefore act in ways that 
they would not if they were subject to individual scrutiny. Further research supported this 
idea, finding that factors that could be said to decrease individual salience led to increased 
antinormative behavior. See, e.g., ZIMBARDO, supra note 64, at 24-25 (summarizing research 
showing that “conditions that make us feel anonymous . . . can foster antisocial, self-
interested behaviors”); Philip G. Zimbardo, The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason, and 
Order Versus Deindividuation, Impulse, and Chaos, in 1969 NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON 
MOTIVATION 237, 263-70 (William J. Arnold & David Levine eds., 1970) (subjects who were 
deindividuated by wearing hoods and lab coats and by working in darkness were more likely 
to administer electric shocks to innocent victims); Eugene W. Mathes & Thomas A. Guest, 
Anonymity and Group Antisocial Behavior, 100 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 257 (1976) (finding that 
both disguise and group membership facilitated feelings of anonymity and increased the 
antinormative behavior of willingness to carry a sign reading “masturbation is fun”). This 
focus on the anonymity aspect of the theory—rather than the social group aspect—made the 
model a natural fit in the Internet age of highly anonymous social interaction. Ironically, it 
is research in the Internet context that has led social psychologists back to a focus on the so-
cial group identity elements of deindividuation theory. See, e.g., Postmes et al., supra, at 
1252 (finding that increased anonymity in computer-mediated communication can have the 
counterintuitive effect of enhancing group identification). The paradox is that a person sit-
ting alone at a computer is highly influenced by the virtual social group with which he iden-
tifies precisely because he is increasingly anonymous. See, e.g., McKenna & Bargh, supra 
note 65; Postmes & Spears, Behavior Online, supra; Tanis & Postmes, supra note 76. 
 78. The priming effects discussed in this section can be invoked either by priming a 
trait directly (for example, “slow,” “smart,” “cooperative,” or “rude”) or by priming a social 
category that evokes the trait through attribution (for example, the category “elderly” 
evokes the trait “slow”). See Dijksterhuis et al., Effects of Priming, supra note 17, at 76. For 
an excellent discussion of the priming research and its legal relevance, see Jerry Kang, Tro-
jan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005). 
 79. See generally SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: THE AUTOMATICITY OF 
HIGHER MENTAL PROCESSES (John A. Bargh ed., 2007). Regarding the priming effect’s per-
sistence over time, see Leif D. Nelson & Michael I. Norton, From Student to Superhero: Sit-
uational Primes Shape Future Helping, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 423,               
428-29 (2005). 
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 The priming research reveals the effect upon behavior of very sub-
tle—often subliminal—cues that invoke social categories or traits.80 A 
common experimental design involves subjects participating in what 
they are told is a language study.81 The subjects are given a scrambled 
sentence or word association test in which are embedded certain 
words that evoke a social category.82 After the subject has finished the 
language task and is under the impression that the experiment is 
over, his or her conduct is observed.83 For example, in an early ex-
periment subjects were given language tasks that included words 
such as “wrinkled,” “cane,” and “gray.”84 After they had completed the 
language task and believed that the experiment was completed, they 
walked significantly more slowly from the testing room to the elevator 
than control subjects who were not unconsciously primed for the social 
category “elderly.”85 In similar experiments, behavioral effects have 
been observed based on primes for the social categories, including 
“business people” person (primed subjects moved more quickly),86 “su-
perhero” (primed subjects were more helpful),87 “punk,” (primed sub-
jects exhibited more nonconformity),88 “professor” (primed subjects 
performed better on Trivial Pursuit questions),89 “soccer hooligan” 
(primed subjects performed worse at Trivial Pursuit),90 and “super-
model” (primed subjects performed less well on a test).91 It appears 
that people associate certain traits with particular social categories 
                                                                                                                     
 80. See John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait 
Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.          
230 (1996). 
 81. Id. at 233. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 234-35. 
 84. See id. at 236. 
 85. Id. at 237. These results have been replicated. See J. G. Hull et al., The Noncon-
sciousness of Self-Consciousness, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 406 (2002); K. Kawa-
kami et al., Automatic Stereotyping: Category, Trait, and Behavioral Activations, 28 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 3 (2002). 
 86. Russell Spears et al., Reaction in Action: Intergroup Contrast in Automatic Behav-
ior, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 605 (2004). 
 87. Nelson & Norton, supra note 79. 
 88. Louise Pendry & Rachael Carrick, Doing What the Mob Do: Priming Effects on Con-
formity, 31 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 83 (2001). 
 89. See Ap Dijksterhuis & Ad van Knippenberg, The Relation Between Perception and 
Behavior, or How to Win a Game of Trivial Pursuit, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
865, 869-71 (1998). 
 90. See id. at 871-72. 
 91. See Ap Dijksterhuis et al., Seeing One Thing and Doing Another: Contrast Effects in 
Automatic Behavior, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 862 (1998) [hereinafter Dijkster-
huis et al., Seeing One Thing]; Geoffrey Haddock et al., Syrian Science and Smart Super-
models: On the When and How of Perception-Behavior Effects, 20 SOC. COGNITION             
461 (2002). 
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and that unconscious primes for the categories cause people to behave 
in accordance with the associated traits.92 
 As might be expected, effects have also been observed in response 
to primes for gender, racial, and ethnic categories.93 For example, par-
ticipants in one study were asked to complete a particularly monoto-
nous computer task, during which either White or African-American 
faces were flashed on the screen too rapidly to be accessible to the 
subjects’ conscious awareness.94 When the test was nearly complete, 
the computer appeared to crash, displaying an error message, and the 
subject was informed he or she would have to begin again.95 Those in-
dividuals who had been subliminally exposed to an African-American 
face reacted with much more hostility than those exposed to a White 
face.96 In another study, which demonstrated the effect of social iden-
tity priming upon the subject’s intellectual performance, female Asian 
college math majors primed with the category “Asian” scored better on 
a math test, while those primed with the category “female” scored 
worse.97 Control subjects primed with nonidentity words performed in 
between these groups.98 
                                                                                                                     
 92. Where subjects did not associate the category with the trait, the effect was not 
found. Bargh et al., supra note 80, at 240. Likewise, the stronger the association between 
the category and the trait, the more pronounced the behavioral effect. See Henk Aarts & Ap 
Dijksterhuis, The Silence of the Library: Environment, Situational Norm, and Social Behav-
ior, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 18, 26 (2003) (noting that research shows that “ac-
cessibility of concepts after priming depends on the associative strength between the con-
cept and prime”). Though this effect is very robust, a few studies have shown a contrary ef-
fect in which the primed subject tends to behave opposite from the stereotypical trait. See 
id. at 86-91 (discussing “contrast effects”). Recently, scholars have developed a more refined 
model that explains the anomalies by showing that whether an assimilation or contrast ef-
fect is observed depends on whether, and how much, the primed identity is viewed as “in-
group” or “out-group” by the subject. See Alison Ledgerwood & Shelly Chaiken, Priming Us 
and Them: Automatic Assimilation and Contrast in Group Attitudes, 93 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 940, 940-41 (2007). 
 93. See Kai J. Jonas & Kai Sassenberg, Knowing How to React: Automatic Response 
Priming from Social Categories, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 709, 709 (2006) (stat-
ing that “[t]his phenomenon [whereby social categories activate attributes and behaviors 
stereotypical of the activated category], called automatic stereotype activation, has been 
demonstrated for numerous social categories such as African-Americans and other ethnics 
of color, women, the elderly, and gays”). 
 94. Bargh et al., supra note 80, at 238-39. 
 95. Id. at 238. 
 96. Id. at 239; see also Mark Chen & John A. Bargh, Nonconscious Behavioral Confir-
mation Processes: The Self-Fulfilling Consequences of Automatic Stereotype Activation, 33 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 541 (1997). 
 97. Margaret Shih et al., Stereotype Susceptibility: Identity Salience and Shifts in 
Quantitative Performance, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 80, 80-81 (1999). 
 98. See id. at 80-81. The phenomenon whereby activation of a “positive” stereotype im-
proves performance is known in literature as “stereotype boost.” See, e.g., Jessi L. Smith & 
Camille S. Johnson, A Stereotype Boost or Choking Under Pressure? Positive Gender Stereo-
types and Men Who Are Low in Domain Identification, 28 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 
51 (2006). The corresponding negative affect is called “stereotype threat.” See, e.g., Harriet 
E. S. Rosenthal et al., Improving Performance Expectancies in Stereotypic Domains: Task 
Relevance and the Reduction of Stereotype Threat, 37 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 586 (2007). 
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 The same effects have been observed where the trait is primed di-
rectly rather than through the mediator of the social category.99 Thus, 
individuals primed with words associated with rudeness interrupted a 
confederate of the experimenter more quickly than those individuals 
primed with words associated with politeness, and control subjects 
primed with neither fell between these two groups.100 In this manner, 
studies have shown behavioral effects for various trait primes, includ-
ing cooperation, aggressiveness, helpfulness, intelligence, and stupid-
ity.101 The priming literature demonstrates that individual and social 
behavior is amenable to being nudged in a prosocial direction by cues 
present in the environment.102 In particular, social interactions can be 
affected by subliminal or supraliminal primes103 that invoke traits 
such as helpfulness, morality, and cooperation.104 
 Interestingly, physical features of the environment can also influ-
ence behavior by invoking shared social norms regarding appropriate 
behavior within a given context. Referred to in the literature as “situ-
ational norms,” these consist of “generally accepted beliefs about how 
to behave in particular situations.”105 Research has shown that nor-
mative behavior can be invoked by priming the physical cues associ-
ated with the particular behavior and that this can occur outside the 
conscious awareness of the individual.106 In one study, subjects primed 
with a photograph of a library subsequently spoke more quietly when 
engaged in a supposedly unrelated experiment about language.107 In 
another study, students who received handbills in their mailboxes 
threw them on the floor when the floor was already littered with 
handbills; when the floor was clean, they did not.108 In addition, mun-
                                                                                                                     
 99. See Bargh et al., supra note 80, at 233-35. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See Betsy Sparrow & Daniel M. Wegner, Unpriming: The Deactivation of Thoughts 
Through Expression, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1009, 1009-10 (2006) (summariz-
ing research and citing sources). 
 102. See, e.g., Aarts & Dijksterhuis, supra note 92. 
 103. Subliminal primes (such as a very rapid flash of a word or photograph) are ob-
served outside of conscious awareness; supraliminal primes (such as the words in a scram-
bled sentence task) are consciously observed, but the subject is unaware of the purpose or 
valence of the terms. See, e.g., Dirk Hermans et al., Affective Priming with Subliminally 
Presented Pictures, 57 CANADIAN J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 97 (2003); see also RANDOM 
HOUSE WEBSTERS COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1301, 1314 (2d ed. 1999) (defining “subliminal” in 
psychology as “existing or operating below the threshold of consciousness” and “supralimi-
nal” as “being above the threshold of perception” of a stimulus). 
 104. See Dijksterhuis et al., Effects of Priming, supra note 17, at 82 (discussing the     
existing research). 
 105. Aarts & Dijksterhuis, supra 92, at 18. 
 106. See id. at 18-20, 25-27 (citing sources). 
 107. Id. at 21-22; see also Janneke F. Joly et al., Silence and Table Manners: When En-
vironments Activate Norms, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1047 (2008) (replicat-
ing and extending the Aarts & Dijksterhaus “silence in the library” study). 
 108. See Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the 
Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1015, 1016-17 (1990). 
120  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:99 
 
dane physical cues can also have a behavioral effect.109 For example, 
primes such as a leather briefcase and a fancy pen have been shown 
to invoke the same behavioral effect as the lexical primes used to in-
voke the stereotype “businessperson.”110 Most recently, experimental 
subjects exhibited increased interpersonal warmth and a greater like-
lihood to behave generously when they were supraliminally primed by 
being asked to briefly hold a warm cup of coffee in the elevator on the 
way to the testing room.111 
 Finally, research on the priming effect has shown that it is possible 
to affect an individual’s level of group identification by priming “I” 
versus “we” associations.112 This is potentially very important, because 
the SIDE model of deindividuation demonstrates the importance of 
social group identification to either normative or antinormative be-
havior.113 The extent to which an individual is inclined to view a par-
ticular group as self-relevant can affect whether the individual’s atti-
tude and behavior move toward, or away from, the perceived attitudes 
and behaviors of the group.114 Furthermore, it is possible to manipu-
late the individual’s degree of identification with the group.115 
 In one set of experiments, subjects were asked to write an essay 
about a day in the life of another student, alternately named “Tyrone 
Walker” or “Erik Walker” (a subtle prime for either African American 
or White).116 The students later took a test; those primed with the Af-
rican-American name performed worse on the test, but the effect was 
much more pronounced for those who had been asked to write their 
essays in the first person than for those who wrote in the third per-
son.117 A summary of the research in this area has noted: 
[I]t is relatively easy to imagine naturalistic settings in which per-
sonal or social self-construals may be activated relatively spontane-
ously by environmental cues. Under circumstances in which one’s 
                                                                                                                     
 109. See Aaron C. Kay et al., Material Priming: The Influence of Mundane Physical Ob-
jects on Situational Construal and Competitive Behavioral Choice, 95 ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 83 (2004). 
 110. See id. at 90-91. In the experiment, the researcher alternately took the research 
questionnaires out of a leather briefcase and provided a business-style pen to the subject or 
took the questionnaires out of a backpack and provided a pencil. Id. at 90. 
 111. Lawrence E. Williams & John A. Bargh, Experiencing Physical Warmth Promotes 
Interpersonal Warmth, 322 SCIENCE 606, 606-07 (2008). 
 112. See, e.g., Diederik A. Stapel & Willem Koomen, I, We, and the Effects of Others on 
Me: How Self-Construal Level Moderates Social Comparison Effects, 80 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 766 (2001). 
 113. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. 
 114. See Dijksterhuis et al., Effects of Priming, supra note 17, at 86-95. 
 115. See id. at 93-95. 
 116. S. Christian Wheeler et al., Think unto Others: The Self-Destructive Impact of 
Negative Racial Stereotypes, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 173, 175-76 (2001). 
 117. See id. at 175-76; see also Dijksterhuis et al., Seeing One Thing, supra note 91, at 
867-68 (demonstrating that subjects conformed behavior toward the general category of 
“professor” but away from the exemplar “Einstein”). 
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individual performance or responsibility is stressed, the personal 
self is activated, whereas situations that stress communal feelings, 
consensus, and togetherness activate the social self.118 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, stress and competition are among the factors 
that can lead to a more individualistic mindset.119 
IV.   CONCLUSION: THE POWER OF THE SITUATION AND THE POWER OF 
THE GROUP 
 Considered together, these separate literatures on deindividuation 
and on priming suggest that it might be possible for institutions to 
promote prosocial behavior and to reduce hate speech by fostering 
identification with those social identity categories for which the nor-
mative structures would tend to discourage hate speech. Furthermore, 
the research suggests that this could be done in subtle—perhaps 
nearly invisible—ways. Paradoxically, a sense of anonymity—or dein-
dividuation—is triggered by identification with a group. However, it is 
not the anonymity per se that leads to antinormative behaviors. 
Rather, the identification with a social group tends to foster attitudes 
and behaviors consonant with the norms of the particular group. Be-
cause attitudes, behaviors, and group identification can be primed by 
features in the social and physical environment, universities poten-
tially could influence behavior (including speech) in prosocial direc-
tions by carefully attending to those features over which they have 
some degree of control, such as physical spaces, institutional culture, 
and social organization. 
 One possible objection to this proposal is that it evokes the specter 
of manipulation and thought control. Just as the prospect of sublimi-
nal advertising is objectionable because it seems to undermine free 
will and consumer choice, so too the prospect of subtle or unconscious 
priming may strike some as an illegitimate way to influence behavior. 
Perhaps the best response to this objection is that situations inevita-
bly influence thoughts and behaviors; if the choice is between moving 
individuals in a prosocial or antisocial direction, it seems obvious that 
the former is preferable. Just as architects design public spaces so as 
to reduce criminal behavior and to promote communal spirit, universi-
ties should design institutional space—both social and physical—to 
promote tolerance, empathy, and cooperation. To take just one rather 
mundane example, much research has demonstrated the effect of mir-
rors in decreasing antinormative behavior.120 Other studies suggest 
                                                                                                                     
 118. Stapel & Koomen, supra note 112, at 778-79. 
 119. See id. at 779. 
 120. See, e.g., S. Christian Wheeler et al., Does Self-Consciousness Increase or Decrease 
Priming Effects? It Depends, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL. PSYCHOL. 882, 883 (2008) (summarizing 
and analyzing the prior research). 
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that inclusive (“we”) primes in the environment can serve to increase 
cooperative behavior and to decrease competitiveness. Indeed, a fea-
ture as simple as the color of a space can affect behavior.121 Though 
this Essay is merely exploratory and very preliminary, social psychol-
ogy research on the influence of situational primes upon behavior and 
goals is a vibrant and fast-moving area that could no doubt inform in-
stitutional design on these questions. 
 Taking such steps would have the further salutary effect that when 
ambiguous incidents did occur, members of minority groups would be 
less likely to interpret them as racist or threatening.122 Furthermore, 
to the extent that negative stereotypes tend to depress motivation and 
achievement, the perception of a safe and welcoming environment will 
counteract this effect.123 
 After studying the issue of campus hate speech in great depth, a 
special committee at the University of Pennsylvania recommended, 
among other things, that the model for freshman housing assignment 
be redesigned and that fraternity and sorority rush be delayed until 
after the first semester of the first year.124 These recommendations 
grew out of recognition that students were self-segregating as they 
chose their residences and that the structure of student living could 
affect other aspects of university life. 
 These recommendations were met with great resistance on the part 
of many students, who argued that the identity-based houses provided 
crucial support for minorities and other marginalized social groups. 
This conflict is an aspect of a larger puzzle that is highlighted by the 
individuation and priming research: group identification can foster ei-
ther prosocial or antisocial behavior, depending on the norms of the 
particular social group which is salient to the individual at a given 
moment. Furthermore, any individual is at once a member of myriad 
social groups; the process of group identification is fluid and dynamic. 
                                                                                                                     
 121. See Andrew J. Elliot et al., Color and Psychological Functioning: The Effect of Red 
on Performance Attainment, 136 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 154 (2007). 
 122. The water buffalo incident at the University of Pennsylvania was ambiguous. The 
African-American women who were the target of the student’s remark interpreted it as rac-
ist, but the speaker insisted (and the University later all but conceded) that in his native 
language the term was a generalized insult that had no racial connotation. See ALAN 
CHARLES KORS & HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THE SHADOW UNIVERSITY: THE BETRAYAL OF 
LIBERTY ON AMERICA’S CAMPUSES (1998). 
 123. See Valerie Purdie-Vaughns et al., Social Identity Contingencies: How Diversity 
Cues Signal Threat or Safety for African Americans in Mainstream Institutions, 94 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 615, 628 (2008). Purdie-Vaughns and her colleagues found 
that where a potential employer was perceived as ethnically diverse, a “colorblind” value 
statement, which the researchers characterized as ambiguous in terms of whether it sig-
naled a welcome atmosphere for minority employees, was not perceived as threatening. Id. 
In contrast, where brochure photos depicted a homogenous workplace, the same value 
statement was viewed as threatening. Id. 
 124. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 22. 
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 A step in the direction of a solution, perhaps, would be to gather 
very specific data on hate speech incidents on college campuses in or-
der to determine the situational features that tend to give rise to such 
behavior; for example, time of day, physical location, weekday versus 
weekend, or involvement of alcohol. Armed with such knowledge, uni-
versities could be more strategic in the way that they either encour-
age or discourage identification with various social identity groups in 
different settings. Though antisocial behaviors, including hate speech, 
are unlikely to disappear altogether, it seems likely (or at least possi-
ble) that institutions could do more to employ the insights derived 
from social and cognitive psychological research to nudge behavior in 
the desired direction. 
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